the school of thought that may be denominated as liberal. 7 Freedom of speech, religion, association, and the right to own property and to labor for personal gain and fulfillment, have therefore been central objects of protection from unwarranted government intrusion.
Much of what has been interesting in this discussion over the last 250 years or so has involved the tension between constricting government's power to trample on the freedom of citizens to do certain things, whether it be to speak, worship, or engage in certain activities, on the one hand, and expanding government's role in ensuring that social conditions do not, as a matter of fact, if not of legal mandate, restrict the ability of large swaths of the community to live the good life. As capitalism emerged as the Western mode of economic development, it was increasingly recognized that the legal abolition of slavery did not in fact mean that the operations of markets freighted with historical baggage did not continue to subjugate many. After all, slavery and related conditions such as indentured servitude endured not only because the state legitimated the concept that a human being could be the legal property of another, but because economic necessity often created irresistible incentives for communities and even parents to sell their children. Sadly, in too many places in the world, what can only be regarded as actual slavery still persists, and employment arrangements resembling indentured servititude are even more common. In the West writ large -the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, etc. -just how completely to prevent de facto economic slavery remains an ongoing subject of debate. But what we can confidently say is that a general consensus exists in the West that humans cannot live a good life without an active role for government in ensuring their freedom from, among other things, working a 70 hour work week, being employed as a child, laboring under unsafe conditions, breathing air and drinking water polluted by manufacturing concerns, suffering injuries from unsafe products, and providing for themselves in their golden years without any societal help.
9
Put simply, it is now widely accepted that the precious freedoms upon which government could not intrude are of little or no utility to those, who by the necessity to eat and find shelter, are forced to spend their lives in ceaseless, bone-grinding, dangerous, and lifeshortening toil, leaving them little time for family life, study, prayer, relaxation, or hedonic pleasure.
As we all know, there were a wide range of views regarding what government should do about the rise of capitalism. There was, of course, that guy named Karl Marx million people in forced labor, bonded labor, forced child labor, and sexual servitude at any given time"). 9 For example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes protections on the topics of maximum working hours, child labor, workplace safety, environmental concerns, consumer protection, social security and social assistance. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION arts. 31-32, 34-38, 2000 /C 364/01, 364/8 (Dec. 18, 2000 . Canada, having acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has a framework of federal, provincial, and territorial laws addressing social policy issues, employment, poverty, homelessness, health care, disability issues, early childhood development and child care, and family violence. and his later followers Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. They had a rather thoroughgoing program to address capitalist excess, one which ultimately involved something far worse.
Although putatively anti-communist, there was also the fascist tradition, which involved the xenophobic and nightmarish apotheosis of a mercantilism directed to serve a sick vision of national glory and historical destiny. On the other side of the debate were those who viewed virtually any governmental involvement in the economy as an unjustified inhibition on liberty and nature itself, believing that if a millworker was not legally compelled to labor 70 hours a week, it was no business of government to prevent her from doing so, and conflating the issues of who had what wealth with who had talent and virtue.
10 10 E.g., HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Caxton ed. 1940) (opposing government interference in the lives of individuals based on natural rights philosophy and social Darwinism). In the infamous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a New York State statute limiting bakers from working in excess of 60 hours in a week or 10 in a day. In so ruling, the Court stated:
he act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts."
198 U. S. 45 (1905) . See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (declaring unconstitutional Congressional statute prohibiting interstate trafficking of goods manufactured or mined by children under the age of 14 or by children between the ages of 14 and 16 who work more than 8 hours per day, 6 days per week); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional minimum wage law for women and children in the District of Columbia).
In fairness, some of the later adherents of this school of thought were also powerfully influenced by their horror at the actual experience of communism and fascism and their fear that any major role for the state risked totalitarianism. E.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) ; see also Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 n.6 (1962) ("[Hayek] ha [s] more than a theoretical attachment to laissez-faire. [He] Emerging as the most successful and enlightened approach to balancing the human need for freedom to pursue happiness without undue government restraint, and the human need for freedom from economic oppression, was a far less doctrinaire and far messier philosophy, that which we in the United States associate with Franklin Roosevelt and regard as the current standard-bearer for the tradition known as liberalism. 11 In Europe, this strain of thought is often termed "social democracy."
For present purposes, it is useful to concentrate on my own nation's experience for a moment. When the Great Depression hit, Americans suffered, and an opening existed for the temptations presented by communism and fascism. Too many of us in the United
States today are ignorant of the reality that these more extreme remedies for market failure were appealing to many Americans in the 1930s.
12 saw the nazi government reduce Germany to an autocracy partly through control of the economic processes of the country."); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7 (1962) . 11 There is an historical fork in the liberal road, of course. Some, for example, Milton Friedman, described themselves as liberals because they were advocates of free markets and private enterprise. In the United States, liberalism is now associated with that school of thought which champions generally free markets whose participants, as producers and consumers, play the primary role in capital investment and spending decisions, but which also believes there is a need for a strong regulatory state that checks capitalist externalities, economic inequality, and economic downturns, while also vigorously protecting civil and human rights. The so-called laissez-faire philosophy, which involves allowing companies (based on pre-existing ownership interests established by prior legal arrangements) to proceed with economic activity and practices virtually without interference from the state in any respect is now more associated with folks who would call themselves conservatives, or perhaps libertarian. The predominant conservative party in the United States does not advocate laissez-faire and indeed may have closer to a mercantilist bent than a laissez-faire, 19 th century liberal one.
The New Deal, in very simplified terms, represented the liberal answer to capitalist market failure. 13 That answer was multi-faceted. One important element was charging the government with the task of helping to ameliorate unemployment and poverty, particularly when the economic cycle was on the downturn. Related was the recognition that government could help smooth economic cycles, through fiscal and regulatory policies that tempered booms and busts. 14 As important was the enactment of federal legal requirements protecting workers from being coerced into unfair conditions of employment. Maximum work weeks and minimum wage laws were federally mandated. 15 Workers were given the right to join unions and bargain collectively for wages. 16 Worker safety protections were eventually implemented. There is a geographic component to these protections that is important and that bears highlighting. Many of the New Deal enactments -such as maximum hours legislation -had been the subject of legislation in some, but not all, American states.
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The New Deal represented in some ways a new founding for the United States, in which our national government was charged with primary regulation over economic policy for the first time. 19 It took a crisis like the Depression to overcome an ingrained strain in the United States, a nation in which many viewed themselves more as citizens of a particular state -i.e., as a South Carolinian or Texan -rather than as an American. The credo of "states rights" hadn't been killed in the Civil War, it had just been prevented from entirely destroying the national union.
But the New Dealers convinced the nation that if the economy were national in scope, it was necessary that the regulations that protected citizens from market failure and excesses be national in scope, too. If, for example, there was a societal consensus that employers should be restricted from hiring children or making workers labor for 70 hours a week, that consensus would be undermined without the establishment of a national floor. Otherwise, hungry capitalists would simply migrate to states that tolerated such practices, putting pressure on workers needing jobs to follow and generally undermining the overall clout of workers to extract better conditions of employment. but they inarguably improved the safety of products and the quality of our nation's air and drinking water.
At the same time as the United States was putting in place a full regime of regulation for corporate behavior, Europe was essentially doing the same thing, albeit in a necessarily somewhat less uniform way. For today's purposes, though, it is sufficient to note that the evolution of the European Union can in many ways been seen as Europe's New Deal. To enjoy the full benefits of EU membership, nation states are expected to comply with a host of minimum standards in a range of areas thought important to the maintenance of just societies in which the many, and not the few, could live the good life. 32 These standards set a floor beneath which nations could not allow corporate behavior to sink.
For a while, the West writ large seemed capable of having it all. We could maintain economic dynamism and promote economic equality. We could make profits while improving product safety and reducing environmental degradation.
At this point, it might be helpful to observe something you likely already know about how the United States regulates corporations. In the United States, so-called corporate law is a narrow domain, almost entirely focused on the internal affairs of the 32 In the latest accession round to the European Union, the ten new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe were required to meet three broad criteria for admission. Needed reforms were categorized into political reforms, economic reforms, and a final criteria relating to social criteria and infrastructure, which included regulation "in the fields of agriculture, environmental, transport, social policy," and other related reforms. Roger J. 433, 444-45 (1962) ("For the present, the system as a whole functions successfully; the public consensus moves in fairly rapidly when trouble becomes apparent; the government supervisory system does reasonably well at making situations apparent, and there seems to be no cause for alarm. But, in the name of which all American interest groups seemed to be thriving and in which a strong social consensus supported the New Deal structures and reforms, it seemed less of a threat to stockholders that directors could consider other interests. As a matter of formalism, the most important corporate law, that of Delaware, gave rhetorical emphasis to the primacy of stockholder interests. But the business judgment rule gave directors wide leeway to consider other corporate constituencies, when such consideration could be justified as being in the long-term interests of stockholders. 40 Given prosperous times, then prevailing political norms, and the weakness of disaggregated stockholders still facing pre-Internet era barriers to collective action, as a practical matter, management had a good deal of room to balance the interests of all corporate constituencies, without tilting heavily in the direction of the stockholders.
And, in their own words, American CEOs in the post-war era embraced Dodd's side of his debate with Berle, articulating their own role as one involving service to the various interests affected by the corporation, interests that included stockholders, to be straight thinking, honest academic description and the Queen's English, let us not bedevil ourselves by calling this a 'management market.' It is a variety of non-statist politics which, at the moment, is giving a quite respectable account of itself."); Id. at 437 ("I have been accused of (and plead guilty to) believing that the businessmen constituting managements in general are more trustworthy and that their standards are higher, than was the case at the close of the twenties."); see also figure out what maximizes profits-that is, that a legal duty to maximize profits is too hard to monitor. And the profit-sacrificing discretion created by business judgment deference suffices to cover the lions' share of profit-sacrificing discretion that exists.").
sure, but which also included the nation itself, the corporation's home communities, its workers, and the consumers of its products and services. Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine) . 43 Friedman argued that corporate managers spending funds on social purposes were, in effect, taxing them. Id. To force or expect corporate fiduciaries to decide where to spend public funds was an impermissible manner of circumventing the political process, and transformed them into civil servants. Id. "On the level of political principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are governmental functions," he wrote, arguing that it was "intolerable" that managers presumably selected for their ability to operate businesses profitably, rather than their policy wisdom and sense of justice, would make morally and ethically-freighted about the allocation of scarce resources to advance the public interest. Friedman's views were controversial at the time. Moreover, his normative arguments seemed to be largely aspirational, as many thought that the positive facts regarding the behavior of corporate managers were more consistent with the proposition that the corporation could be managed with the objective of serving various corporate constituencies in a balanced way. 44 Certainly, public opinion in the United States was soundly against Friedman, with most Americans believing that for-profit corporations not 44 For example, Martin Lipton argued the "system of corporate governance places the directors at the center of corporate decisionmaking and has expanded the corporation's responsibilities to safeguard interests broader than those of shareholders alone." Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW 101, 106 (1979) . Lipton believed that it was "wellsettled" by 1979 that "corporations must protect the environment, must protect the health and safety of employees, must protect the pensions of employees, must produce safe products and replace products found to have defects, may make charitable contributions from corporate funds, may spend corporate funds, or assign employees to engage in activities, for the betterment of communities in which the corporation operates." Id.; see also id. at 119 ("After five decades of continuous efforts both to raise the consciousness of directors with respect to issues of national policy, and to impose on corporations and their directors obligations to employees, customers and communities, it is impossible to contemplate a [legal] rule" that would require a board to accept a takeover simply to profit stockholders if that threatened harm to these other constituencies).
only could, but should, give heavy weight to the interests of their workers and consumers, even when that came at a cost to stockholders. think, is the right word. We're not shutting the borders anytime soon but unease is widespread, across the political spectrum. There is a sense that we are losing control of our own destiny and the ability to provide economic security and stability to our citizens, but we seem to lack the political vocabulary and maturity to discuss what is facing us in any but the crudest of terms. Delaware did not go to these extremes, our case law did give corporate directors broad authority to make their own decisions about whether a takeover was good for stockholders and to resist it if the board believed in good faith that the stockholders 50 "In the 1980s, about 30 percent of America's Fortune 500 companies received takeover bids. This is an extraordinary number, indicating that shareholder power via takeover bids had to be on the minds of all large firm managers. The 1980s were also, consistent with the thesis here, arguably one of the periods of strongest product market competition. Not only were American manufacturing markets workably competitive, but international competition was, for essentially the first time, pounding every manufacturer that could not perform. Hostile takeovers were, and despite the rise of the poison pill still are, an engine of shareholder wealth maximization. given the choice to, nor could they rationally, invest in particular companies. Instead, they gave their money to mutual funds and other investment funds, which made the decisions about what shares to buy and how to vote those shares.
For obvious reasons, these institutions were primarily focused on generating impressive current returns. They fixated on eliminating barriers to takeovers and turbocharging managerial incentives to pump up stock prices as their corporate governance agenda. They sought to populate boards with super-majorities of independent directors who would be more responsive to their demands for measures that would increase stock prices.
As the 20 th Century ended, institutional investors controlled well over half of the stock in American corporations, and the percentage is continuing to rise. 60 This separation of "ownership from ownership" made the triumph of Milton Friedman's vision even more complete. As a matter of fiduciary duty, these institutions have a clear responsibility to take steps to increase the value of the funds they manage. 61 Thus, they from defined benefit plans, where the employer controls the underlying investments, to defined contribution plans, where the employee controls the underlying investments Of course, there are a number of investment funds affiliated with labor unions or religious institutions that regularly make non-binding proposals to corporations about issues of social responsibility. 64 But they are the exception that proves the rule. The bulk of the institutional money is run by money managers whose investors have not charged them with having a social conscience. 65 These money managers control most of the vote and they are focused on profits. That focus leads them regularly to support activist investors who pressure corporations to reduce operating costs, increase leverage, or accept takeover bids. Put bluntly and summarily, the agenda of the institutional investor community is to make and hold management accountable for increasing stockholder wealth. In particular, the institutional investor community has sought to put itself in a LAWYER 67, 79-80 (2003) . 65 According to a recent article, only 9% of professionally managed assets were in so-called "socially responsible" investments. Henry Blodget, The Conscientious Investor, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2007, at 82. To be fair, many workers are given only a limited choice of investment funds into which to place their retirement savings. As a result, they may not have the option to choose a socially responsible investment fund.
position to direct the determination of corporate policy, by improving its capability to replace the board if the board does not take action favored by the stockholders. Having illustrated its muscle to replace corporate management when it is unhappy, the institutional investor community has made corporate managers even more focused on stockholder value.
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As a practical matter, the American corporate law question of the corporation's purpose has been settled in favor of stockholders. The fight that goes on is really about the appropriate form of agency to achieve maximal returns for investors. Would stockholders be better off if directors and managers were given some insulation from stockholder influence and therefore better able to pursue capital-intensive strategies designed to generate long-term returns? Or would they be better served by a system that 66 "If investors are insulated from the consequences of corporate production in public corporations in which they own stock directly, then one might reasonably expect those same individuals to be even more insulated from what is going on in companies the stock of which they own only indirectly through mutual funds, pension funds, and the like. As Elhauge has observed, 'they are [now] twice removed from knowledge and responsibility. . . .
* * *
The structure of the public corporation 'insulates . . . shareholders from social and moral sanctions and processes,' both by rendering them 'largely anonymous' to the public, as well as by virtue of their 'relative lack of information about how corporate operations may impact the public interest.' Consequently, [Elhauge] argues, shareholders could push all that much harder for profit maximization 'untempered by social consequences,' and a management team focused on their interests would indeed render the corporation 'soulless' for lack of the 'social and moral processes' that constrain individuals acting on their own."
Christopher M. (2005)); see also Blodget, supra note 41, at 86 (noting that 80% of investors in so-called socially responsible funds say they would not buy them unless they produced returns equal to or greater than conventional funds, and noting that these investors "may be delusional" because "finance theory" suggests that investors are unlikely to "get the best of both worlds -responsible practices and superior returns").
enables them to easily replace management if management is not following current stockholder sentiment regarding the company's policies? This debate is not one over the object of corporate activity, but the best way to get there.
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Even this narrower debate is of questionable relevance. With the ease of information flow facilitated by the Internet, the huge voting positions held by institutional investors, and the desire of institutional investors to lock in short-term gains from premium-generating transactions, stockholders are finding it easier than ever to directly influence corporate decisionmaking. The capital markets are driving managers, not the other way around.
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The amoral content of the current conversation between managers and institutional investors should not surprise anyone steeped in history. A dialogue between top executives (one capitalist instrumentality) and money managers (another) is not likely to include the serious and high-minded consideration of issues like economic equality or environmental responsibility.
As the investor class itself globalizes in search of higher returns, this dialogue is likely to be even more focused solely on issues of stockholder return. With cross-border merger activity, more and more corporations are losing any national identity. Just as domestic merger activity has converted many former headquarters into mere shrunken outposts that can be closed in short order, so too is cross-border activity rendering the concept of an American, Canadian, French, or British corporation quaint. The pressures for performance compel these corporations to move operations and focus where the most gain can be made, even if that requires diminishing beneficial activity in the corporation's traditional "home."
Within the foreseeable future, corporate stockholder bases could also lose a clear national identity. This will put pressure on an old foundational element of the arguments made by the Milton Friedman school, which is that increases in stockholder wealth will increase national wealth for the good of the citizenry as a whole. income of Americans but a robust increase in economic inequality. 71 The haves have far more than ever, and the gap between them and others has ballooned.
As the investor class globalizes, we face the reality that increases in returns to equity will increasingly flow, not to domestic investors, but to investors abroad. If those returns result from corporate operations mostly conducted abroad, a so-called American corporation could mostly be American in name only, deriving most of its profits from international operations and paying out most of those profits to foreign investors. too does an older American stereotype, which portrays Americans as a tad frightened of the world and desiring nothing more than to retreat within our own borders, and to shape our own destiny, untainted by influence or contact from the outside world. Our friends might say these images actually consist with each other, in that our insularity reflects itself even in our international endeavors, interacting externally mainly out of self-interest and mostly by attempting to impose our own solutions and values on others, without expressing any reciprocal willingness to be subject to international norms. Certainly there is some truth in that.
But there is also a more idealistic streak that runs through the United States's international relations, which is premised on the notion that there are in fact certain rights that are of universal appeal, which all humans desire and to which all humans are entitled. Although I recognize that there is a basis for cynicism about America's motives, I believe that a genuine desire to extend the blessings of freedom to others has inspired many of my nation's foreign policy initiatives.
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But the purpose of my address today is not to win over those of you who harbor doubts about the good faith and wisdom of your southern neighbors. Rather, it is highlight the economic realities that should motivate self-interested Americans in seeking closer relations with your nation and other of its Western allies.
The body of law that I apply every day -American corporation law -has no answer to the challenges facing Americans as a result of globalization. American 76 For an accessible piece taking this more optimistic view and relating an important American Foreign aid initiative, the Marshall Plan, to current circumstances, see Nicolaus Mills, A Globalism for Our Time, AM. PROSPECT 35 (July & August, 2007) . corporation law will continue its important, but very discrete role, in ensuring that corporate managers are faithful to the legal and fiduciary duties they owe to their corporation's stockholders. That law will no doubt continue to protect the ability of directors -during their term of office -to undertake corporate strategies even if those strategies are not favored by the stockholders. But that law will do little, if anything, to
give managers the ability to give consideration to the interests of other corporate constituencies that rivals that of the stockholders. That is a naïve and unrealistic hope.
Rather, the realities of the marketplace and the power of institutional investors will guarantee that corporations are governed for the primary purpose of increasing returns to equity. Indeed, the controversies over executive compensation are in large measure a direct result of the increasing focus on stock price returns, as CEOs seek rents to compensate them for the increased riskiness of their tenures and the callousness of the cost-cutting measures they are regularly asked to undertake, and for what they perceive as their rightful share of the equity value they've created for stockholders. Indeed, if it were not a serious subject, the sight of institutional investors complaining about levels of executive compensation their own policy proposals have fueled would be amusing.
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The internecine battles among the haves of corporate governance -that is, CEOs, independent directors, institutional investors, and those who make up the emergent from unreasonable conditions of employment, that the environment was free from despoilment, and the consumers were free from dangerous products.
The United States and its Western allies now face an historically familiar moment.
As discussed, during the New Deal, citizens of particular American states, by necessity, risked a society in which a national government, over which they definitionally had less influence, rather than their own state government, over which they wielded comparatively greater clout, would regulate the most important aspects of corporate behavior. But they gave up a form of local power that was increasingly more powerful in name, than in reality, so as to gain the protective benefits of an effective national government. They did so in order to create a form of capitalism worth saving, in the sense that it served well the many, rather than just the few. Similarly, the emergence of the European Union and its establishment of European-wide standards for corporate behavior and the fair treatment of workers represented a similar kind of moment, in which it was recognized that the advance of human freedom, in its broadest sense, required citizens of particular nation-states to risk giving important aspects of their nation's sovereignty over to something larger.
The concept of the United States joining together with its Western allies to globalize enforceable standards of responsible corporate behavior is a difficult one for Americans to fathom. Such an endeavor would require the United States to subject itself more fully and diversely to enforceable international standards, standards that would therefore not exactly match America's own preferences. But we must give in order to receive. Figuring out how to build on the imperfect international institutions that now exist and to use them as a means for progress toward the globalization of an enlightened capitalism will be a daunting and patience-challenging endeavor.
But anyone committed to the progress of human freedom knows that we have little choice but to try, and to do so with much greater urgency. Such an endeavor will admittedly involve a concerted effort to globalize Western values and standards, notions like decent minimum wages, maximum work weeks, the right to unionize, and proper regard for the environment and consumers. But having already decided to allow our corporations to globalize their operations, and therefore to globalize the Western tradition of private, for-profit enterprise, it hardly seems a logical moral dividing line to pull back from globalizing the regulatory framework Western nations have developed to ensure that corporate behavior advances social welfare. Indeed, I can think of few beliefs more immoral than assuming that our brethren in the developing world desire to work for, and live in communities dominated by, capital, but under the conditions that prevailed in the West in the 19 th century, rather than in the prosperous and more decent post-war era.
There is nothing natural about the scope of product and capital markets. 87 In other words, the polity -in some effective manner -must expand to the global scope of markets in which corporate power is influential, in order to protect the freedom of its citizens, all of humanity.
In my judgment, history demonstrates that there is little doubt whether action of that kind will ultimately be required to protect the ability of humans to live the good life, to enjoy freedom in its fullest sense. A mature reflection of human experience might also suggest that the wisest answer to the question of when to begin would have been some time ago, but is presently a very clear and certain, right now. 87 Id.
